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Abstract This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the 
Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic 
and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate 
that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common 
Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric 
players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the 
Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the 
game  is  non-cooperation.  The  paper  also  addresses  the  possibility  of  enhancing 
cooperation  through  more  flexible  fishing  strategies.  The  results  indicate  that  partial 
cooperation is stable under a specific sharing scheme. It is also shown that substantial 
economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The Atlantic salmon of the Baltic Sea is a valuable resource shared by several coastal 
states. Damming, pollution, overfishing and changes in the Baltic Sea ecosystem have 
caused a serious decline in the wild naturally reproducing salmon stocks (Karlsson and 
Karlström 1994). Therefore, in 1997 the now defunct  International Baltic Sea  Fishery 
Commission launched the Baltic Salmon Action Plan that aimed to recover wild Baltic 
salmon  stocks.  The  goal  was  to  reach  50%  of  the  estimated  smolt  (juvenile  salmon) 
production  capacity  by  2010.  Presently  it  is  expected  that  only  some  of  the  more 
productive  salmon  stocks  will  reach  this  goal  (ICES  2008).    To  ensure  sustainable 
management  of  the  Baltic  salmon  stocks,  the  European  Commission  have  therefore 
decided  to  develop  a  new  management  framework  for  Baltic  salmon  (European 
Commission 2007). 
The salmon fishery in the Baltic Sea is regulated by the European Union's Common 
Fisheries  Policy  (CFP)  that  determines  each  country’s  total  allowable  catch  (TAC). 
Additionally, each country has its own regulations, for instance regarding the length of the 
fishing  season.  The  salmon  TAC  in  the  Baltic  Sea  region  is  shared  among  the  EU 
countries  according  to  the  Relative  Stability  Principle  (RSP)  (Council  Regulation  no. 
172/83) that allocates to each member state a fixed percentage of the catch volume yearly 
available. The total TAC is a result from the political decision process based on scientific 
salmon stock assessment. Based on the RSP each member state knows the total TAC level 
required to maintain its own share high enough. Consequently, member states have an 
incentive to "talk up" the total TAC (Boude et al. 2001). Salmon catches in the Baltic Sea 
have declined since 1990 from 5600 tonnes in 1990 to 1275 tonnes in 2006 (ICES 2007). 
Despite the decline in catches, the TAC has been set so high that it does not restrict the 
fishery. Since early 1990s, the reported salmon catches have been near 70% of the TAC 
(Aps et al. 2007). 
As explained above, CFP sets the framework for the salmon fisheries management 
according to which all countries harvesting salmon negotiate and agree on TAC annually. 
However, this framework appears to have failed to achieve CFP's objectives to maintain 
sustainable  salmon  stocks  and  economically  viable  fishing  industries.  This  failure 
occurred despite the enormous number of biological (Säisä et al. 2003; Jokikokko et al. 
2004;  Kallio-Nyberg  et  al.  2004;  Säisä  et  al.  2005)  and  management  related  studies 
(Karlsson and Karlström 1994; Koljonen et al. 1999; Romakkaniemi et al. 2003; Uusitalo 
et  al.  2005;  Michielsens  et  al.  2008)  on  the  Baltic  salmon.  Studies  addressing  the 
economic  dimensions  of  the  Baltic  salmon  fisheries  are,  however,  scarce  (Laukkanen 
2001; Laukkanen 2003; Kulmala et al. 2008). The poor state of the salmon stocks in the 
Baltic Sea and the low catches compared to the TACs raise a fundamental question: does a 
real cooperative management of the species exists? To answer this question we analyze 
strategic  interactions  between  the  countries  harvesting  salmon  through  a  coalition 
formation model. 
The earlier studies on the cooperative management of the migrating fish stocks have 
used  characteristic  function  (C-function)  games  to  address  the  sharing  of  cooperative   4 
surplus (see e.g. Kaitala and Lindroos 1998; Duarte et al. 2000; Lindroos 2004). Recently, 
games in the partition function (P-function) form have been introduced in the fisheries 
literature (Pintassilgo 2003; Pham Do and Folmer 2006). P-function games are able to 
analyse potential externalities of coalition formation, i.e. the effects that mergers produce 
on the non-merging players. Fishery games generally exhibit positive externalities, that is, 
when some fishing states join together in a coalition the other states benefit from it. This 
generally occurs as the coalition tends to reduce its fishing effort in order to better manage 
and safeguard a fish stock. The states outside the coalition benefit from those efforts, 
through an increase in the stock availability. In this context, free rider incentives tend to be 
present and therefore a grand coalition is rarely an equilibrium outcome (Yi 1997). 
The bioeconomic model of the Baltic salmon fishery that we use was developed by 
Kulmala et al. (2009) and it is based on the state-of-the-art population dynamic model 
used in the salmon stock assessment (ICES 2008; Michielsens et al. 2008). Kulmala et al. 
(2009)  analysed  the  two  polar  management  scenarios:  grand  coalition  and  non-
cooperation. In this paper, we employ the P-function approach, which allows for partial 
cooperation. This approach is used to analyse characteristics of the fishery game, such as 
the existence of positive externalities, to determine the stability of all possible coalitions, 
and the equilibrium of the game. 
The coalition formation is modelled as a single-coalition and open-membership game 
(D'Aspremont et al. 1983). This paper fills a gap in the literature by providing an empirical 
application  of  coalition  formation  in  fisheries.  In  particular,  it  is  directly  related  to 
previous  theoretical  studies  such  as  Eyckmans  and  Finus  (2004)  and  Pintassilgo  and 
Lindroos  (2008).  The  former  proposes  a  sharing  scheme  to  distribute  the  gains  from 
cooperation in coalition games with externalities. The latter analyses coalition formation 
in  fisheries  using  the  classical  Gordon-Schaefer  bioeconomic  model  (Gordon  1954; 
Schaefer 1957). In addition, we address the following question raised by Yi (1997): "As 
hard  as  the  analysis  may  be,  the  heterogeneity  of  players  raises  the  interesting  and 
important  issue  of  the  composition  of  coalitions:  do  coalitions  in  a  stable  coalition 
structure  [...]  consist  of  similar  players  or  dissimilar  players  or  both?”  Due  to  the 
migration  pattern  of  salmon,  the  catch  of  different  countries  has  a  different  effect  on 
different  salmon  stocks.  Consequently,  our  detailed  analysis  of  potentially  stable 
coalitions  will  give  insights  into  the  planning  and  implementation  of  the  forthcoming 
salmon management plan. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  The  next  section  presents  the  underlying 
bioeconomic model. Section 3 defines the game and the stability concepts. In Section 4, 
we discuss the results from the fisheries policy scenario compatible with RSP. Section 5 
presents the results from optimal fishery policies. Section 6 discusses the implications of 
partial cooperation to the salmon stocks and Section 7 concludes the study.   5 
2 Bioeconomic Model 
The  underlying  bioeconomic  simulation  model  on  which  we  base  our  coalition  game 
follows Kulmala et al. (2009).  The model considers four fishing states controlling around 
80%  of  the  TAC  and  catching  90%  of  the  annual  salmon  catch:  Finland,  Sweden, 
Denmark and Poland. The countries differ from each other in terms of the structure of the 
salmon fleet, fishing costs, salmon price and harvestable stock size. We review shortly this 
highly disaggregate and sequential model in those parts that are necessary to understand 
the present analysis and results. 
Figure 1 illustrates the salmon migration routes in the Baltic Sea and Figure 2 the 
population dynamics model with sequential fishery. The adult salmon recruit mainly to the 
fishery during their feeding migration to the Baltic Main Basin. There, salmon is harvested 
by offshore driftnets and longlines which we denote by ODN and OLL, respectively. All 
four countries participate in these fisheries. The offshore fisheries take place in the winter 
time and by assumption in the model the offshore driftnet fishery occurs in October and 
the longliners in December. In the spring time, the mature salmon start their spawning 
migration  towards  their  home  rivers.  Then,  the  homing  fish  are  harvested  by  coastal 
driftnet  (CDN)  and  coastal  trapnet  (CTN)  fisheries  in  the  Bothnian  Sea  and  in  the 
Bothnian  Bay.  Finland  and  Sweden  are  the  only  countries  participating  in  the  coastal 
fisheries. Finally, the salmon is harvested by river fisheries, which are mainly recreational. 
These catches are accounted for in the biological part of the model by being deducted to 
the number of spawners. However, the economic value of these river fisheries has not 
been included in the model, which only accounts for the value of commercial fisheries. 
The option to concentrate on the value of commercial fisheries is due to two motives. 
First, the economic value of river fisheries is mainly composed of recreational benefits, 
which  are  non-market  values.  Estimating  it,  through  appropriate  valuation  methods,  is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Secondly, the annual TAC set under the framework of 
European Union's Common Fisheries Policy only refers to commercial fisheries. 
Table 1 illustrates the fleet structure of each country and its different target salmon 
stocks.  The  population  dynamics  model  considers  the  life  history  of  15  naturally 
reproducing salmon stocks, two of which are located in Finland (rivers Tornionjoki and 
Simojoki) and the remainder in Sweden. The migration route of salmon is dependent on 
the location of their home rivers. Therefore, it affects the stock available for each geartype 
and country. In addition, the model considers the life cycle of hatchery-reared salmon and 
their contribution to the salmon catches. These facts are encompassed on the economic 
part of the model that assesses each country's net present value from the fishery. The 
model  considers  the  years  1995-2005.  Thus,  it  allows  us  to  compare  the  actual 
performance  of  the  fishery  with  those  that  could  have  occurred  under  alternative 
economically sound fishing policies. 
 










































Figure 1  Migration routes of salmon (arrows) and the grouping of salmon stocks in  6 
assessment units in the Baltic Sea. 
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Figure 2  Schematic presentation of the bioeconomic model.   7 
Table 1  Wild salmon stocks and the fleet structure of the four countries. 
CDN 
Salmon stock Assesment unit FI SWE DK POL FI FI (BS) FI (BB) SWE (BS) SWE (BB)
1 Tornionjoki 1 X X X X X X X
2 Simojoki 1 X X X X X X X
3 Kalixälven 1 X X X X X X X
4 Råneälven 1 X X X X X X X
5 Piteälven 2 X X X X X X X
6 Åbyälven 2 X X X X X X X
7 Byskeälven 2 X X X X X X X
8 Rickleån 2 X X X X X X X
9 Sävarån 2 X X X X X X X
10 Ume/Vindelälven 2 X X X X X X X
11 Öreälven 2 X X X X X X X
12 Lögdeälven 2 X X X X X X X
13 Ljungan 3 X X X X X X X
14 Mörrumsån 4 X X X X
15 Emån 4 X X X X
OLL & ODN  (MB) CTN
   8 
3 Coalition Formation Game 
In this section we define a two-stage partition function game in order to understand the 
strategic  interaction  between  Finland,  Sweden,  Denmark  and  Poland.  We  study  the 
coalition  formation  of  these  countries  by  applying  a  simultaneous-move  and  open-
membership game. For instance, Pintassilgo (2003) and Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008) 
have adopted the same approach in addressing straddling fish stocks. The game consists of 
two  stages.  In  the  first,  players  decide  whether  to  behave  as  singletons  or  to  join  a 
coalition. We adopt the assumption of only one non-trivial (non-singleton) coalition (see 
e.g.  Eyckmans  and  Finus  2004).  Therefore,  each  player  can  only  choose  to  play  as  a 
singleton or to join the coalition. In the second stage, singleton(s) and coalition play non-
cooperatively by choosing the fishing effort strategies that maximise their payoffs, given 
the  behaviour  of  the  others.  The  game  is  solved  by  backward  induction  for  the  Nash 
equilibrium coalition structure. 
3.1 Partition Function 
Throughout  the  paper  we  follow  the  definitions  and  notation  of  Eyckmans  and  Finus 
(2004). We denote our coalition game between the n(= 4) players by ( ) , N p G . A coalition 
S is defined as  a subset of the set of players  { } 1,..., N n =  and the set of  all possible 
coalitions  of  N  is  represented  by2
N .  The  analysis  is  restricted  to  coalition  structures 
consisting  of  only  one  non-trivial  coalition  S,  with  all  other  players \ j N S Î   being 
singletons
1. Therefore, each coalition structure is fully characterized by coalition S. We 
define  a  restricted  partition  function  p   that  assigns  a  single  real  number  ( ) S S p   to 
coalition S and real numbers  ( ) j S p to each singleton coalition as: 
(1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1 : ,     with    \ .
n s
S j S S S S j N S p p p p
+ - = Î Î ֏ ℝ  
The domain of the restricted partition function is the set of all possible coalitions( ) 2
N . 
The image of this mapping is a vector with variable size,  ( ) ( ) 1 n s + -  where s is the 
number of players in the coalition (cardinality of coalition S). 
Since we are interested in analysing the players' incentives to form coalitions, we need 
to define how each player values the coalitions. Therefore, we define a valuation function 
v to each coalition that prescribes how the worth of coalition S is allocated among its 
members. A valuation function assigns to every coalition  S  of  N  a real-valued vector of 
length n , ( ) :2 :
N n v S v S ® ℝ ֏ , such that:  
                                                 
1 This approach is, therefore, a special case of the general definition of partition functions defined for 
instance by Bloch (2003).   9 
(2) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )               \ .
i S i S
j j
v S S
v S S j N S
p
p
Î  = 

= " Î  
∑
 
Valuations  ( ) i v S  satisfies group rationality, meaning that the entire worth of coalition S, 
( ) S S p , is allocated to its members. For each singleton, the valuation  ( ) j v S coincides with 
the worth  ( ) j S p  assigned by the partition function. As equation (2) shows the valuation 
specifies the payoff for the coalition members and the singletons and does this for all 
possible coalitions. Therefore, for any coalition structure, each player is able to evaluate 
its gains compared to full non-cooperation. Consequently, a valuation fixes the sharing 
rule of the cooperative surplus that is the excess of the coalition payoff over the sum of its 
players’ payoffs under full non-cooperation. 
3.2 Attributes of the game 
Let  us  now  define  formally  the  concepts  of  positive  externalities,  superadditivity  and 
global efficiency. These attributes of the game play an important role in determining if the 
grand-coalition  is  stable  and  whether  the  economic  and  biological  benefits  of  the 
cooperation between Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Poland, suggested by Kulmala et al. 
(2009), would be realised. 
A coalition game  ( ) , N p G  exhibits positive externalities if and only if its partition 
function  p satisfies:  ( ) { } ( ) , , : \ . j j S N j i j S S S i p p " Í " ¹ Ï ³
2  Positive  externalities 
imply that the remaining singletons do not lose when coalitions merge.  
A  coalition  game  ( ) , N p G   is  superadditive  if  and  only  if  its  partition  function 
p satisfies:  ( ) { } { } ( ) { } ( ) \ , : \ \ . S i S i S N i S S S i S i p p p " Í " Î ³ +   Superadditivity  implies 
that that the value of the coalition must be at least the value of the coalition when one 
player  deviates  plus  the  payoff  of  the  deviator  after  deviation.  Thus,  superadditivity 
implies that a merger does not decrease the aggregate welfare of the merging players. 
Finally, we say that a coalition game  ( ) , N p G is globally efficient if and only if: 
{ } ( ) { } ( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( ) \ \ , \ : . S j S j j N S i j N S S N i N S S i S i S S p p p p
Î È Î " Ì " Î È + È ³ + ∑ ∑  
Thus,  if  a  partition  function  is  superadditive  the  grand  coalition  is  always  the  most 
efficient  coalition  structure.    However,  if  the  game  is  both  superadditive  and  exhibits 
positive externalities, the grand coalition may not be stable. That happens if the free rider 
incentives due to the positive externalities exceed the superadditivity effect.  
                                                 
2  Eyckmans  and  Finus  (2004)  define  positive  externalities: 
( ) { } ( ) , , : \ j j S N j i j S S S i p p " Í " ¹ Ï ³   and  ( ) { } ( ) , : \ . k k k i k S S S i p p $ ¹ Ï >   However, 
their results are robust to our more loose definition that considers also the neutral effects of coalition 
formation.  
   10 
3.3 Stability Concept 
We adopt the definition for stable coalition due to D'Aspremont et al. (1983). According 
to it coalition S is considered to be stable with respect to the valuations  ( ) v S  if and only if 
S is both internally and externally stable. A coalition game  ( ) , N p G  is internally stable 
(IS) if and only if:  ( ) { } ( ) : \ . i i i S v S v S i " Î ³  Internal stability implies that no coalition 
member finds it optimal to leave the coalition
3. A coalition game  ( ) , N p G  is externally 
stable (ES) if and only if:  ( ) { } ( ) \ : . j j j N S v S v S j " Î ³ È  External stability (ES) implies 
that no singleton finds it optimal to join the coalition. As defined earlier, the valuation 
function  specifies  how  the  worth  of  coalition  S   is  allocated  among  its  members. 
Therefore,  as  there  are  several  valuation  functions  that  can  be  derived  from  a  single 
partition  function,  a  coalition  S   may  be  stable  with  respect  to  a  particular  valuation 
function but not be with respect to another. 
                                                 
3 Since the paper focus on only one non-trivial coalition, internal stability coincides with the stand alone 
stability defined by Yi (1997). According to it, a coalition structure is stand-alone stable if no player finds it 
optimal  to  leave  its  coalition  to  form  a  singleton  coalition,  holding  the  rest  of  the  coalition  structure 
constant.   11 
4 Restricted effort strategies 
The present section presents the results of the coalition formation game that is constructed 
to  reflect  fisheries  policy  under  RSP
4.  The  objective  of  the  coalition  members  is  to 
maximise the sum of their net present value (NPV) from the salmon fishery given that the 
players outside the coalition also maximize their NPV. The maximisation of the coalition 
is, however, constrained by the restriction that all coalition members harvest and adopt the 
same proportional change to the fishing efforts reported in the period 1995-2005 (ICES 
2008). Throughout the  paper, it is assumed that the strategy  space of  each country is 
bounded below by zero and upper by the fishing strategy that the country would adopt if it 
were the sole exploiter of the stock (see e.g. Arnason et al. 2000). The strategy of country 











  = Î  , where  , k t X  represents the ratio of country’s 
k fishing effort in  year  t ( ) , k t E  to its reported fishing effort  ( ) ,
rep
k t E ; and  k X the upper 
bound of this ratio. 
Table 2 illustrates the partition function  ( ) S p  and valuation function  ( ) v S  for each 
coalition structure. The partition function assigns a payoff for the coalition,  ( ) S S p , and 
for the singletons,  ( ), \ j S j N S p " Î . The valuation function also indicates the payoff each 
coalition member gets, ( ) i S v S Î , which in this case corresponds to their own fishing effort, 
as  transfers  between  coalition  members  are  not  considered.  Except  for  the  singleton 
coalition  structure,  the  value  of  the  coalition  ( ) S S p   is  shown  in  shaded.  Coalition 
structures 3, 4 and 7 produced several Nash equilibrium for the fishing effort strategies. 
We considered all as equally likely and therefore used the corresponding expected values 
for the fishing effort strategies and payoffs. 
The results show that the merger of coalitions increases the payoff of the non-merging 
players,  for  example  when  Finland  and  Sweden  form  a  coalition  (2)  the  payoffs  of 
Denmark and Poland increases. Consequently, the game exhibits positive externalities. 
However, the results show that the game is not superadditive. That can be easily verified 
for  instance  by  looking  at  coalition  structure  2,  where  Finland  and  Sweden  form  a 
coalition. The value of the two player coalition (5149) is less than the sum of the payoffs 
the  two  players  would  get  if  the  coalition  would  break  apart  (6035,  under  coalition 
structure 1). Further, although the merger of coalitions generally increases the aggregate 
payoffs there are exceptions. Thus, the game is also not globally efficient.  
Finally,  the  results  show  that  cooperation  among  the  four  countries  is  not  stable. 
Furthermore,  the  only  stable  coalition  structure  is  full  non-cooperation,  where  all  the 
players  are  singletons
5.  These  results  help  to  explain  why  the  cooperation  among  the 
                                                 
4 The results show the partition function of the "Cooperation A" scenario analyzed in Kulmala et al. 
(2009). 
5  In our game the coalition structure formed only by singletons is stable by definition because it can be 
generated by  =Æ S , that is all players announce not to join the agreement. This coalition structure is 
internally stable as no player can withdraw and also externally stable because if only one player changes 
its announcement the coalition structure remains the same. 
   12 
fishing states, under the auspices of the European Union, seems to be  trivial.  In fact, 
according to the results, the fishing efforts under full cooperation should be 40% lower 
that  what  has  been  effectively  reported  by  the  four  countries.  Furthermore,  we  can 
conclude that  reported fishing effort strategies  by the two major players of the  game, 
Finland and Sweden, are close to the ones under full non-cooperation (coalition structure 
1). Thus, it can be argued that the management of the salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea, 
from 1995 to 2005, resembles the case of full non-cooperation. In the next section we 
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Table 2  Partition and value functions in thousand's of euros (t€) for the proportional 
  shares strategies. 
Coalition (S)     Finland  Sweden  Denmark  Poland 
        1  2  3  4  total  IS  ES 
strategy  0.9  1.05  0.45  1.35    
v(S)  4101  1934  170  1451    
1  (1),(2),(3),(4)  π(S)  4101  1934  170  1451  7656  yes  yes 
strategy  0.6  0.6  0.9  1.5    
v(S)  3631  1518  577  1792    
2  (1,2), (3), (4)  π(S)  5149  577  1792  7518  no  yes 
E[strategy]  0.6  1.125  0.6  1.425    
E[v(S)]  3425  2317  302  1609    
3  (1,3), (2), (4)  E[π(S)]  3728  2317    1609  7654  no  yes 
E[strategy]  0.675  1.425  1.275  0.675    
E[v(S)]  4166  3765  1344  919    
4  (1,4), (2), (3)  E[π(S)]  5086  3765  1344    10194  no  yes 
strategy  0.9  0.6  0.6  1.5    
v(S)  4241  1275  248  1640    
5  (2,3), (1), (4)  π(S)  4241  1523  1640  7404  no  yes 
strategy  0.9  0.75  1.35  0.75    
v(S)  5258  2330  1577  1066    
6  (2,4), (1), (3)  π(S)  5258  3395  1577     10231  no  yes 
E[strategy]  0.975  1.425  0.6  0.6    
E[v(S)]  5545  4078  760  867    
7  (3,4), (1), (2)  E[π(S)]  5545  4078  1627  11251  no  yes 
strategy  0.6  0.6  0.6  1.5    
v(S)  3904  1713  525  1927    
8  (1,2,3), (4)  π(S)  6142  1927  8069  no  yes 
strategy  0.6  0.6  1.95  0.6    
v(S)  4598  2372  3217  979    
9  (1,2,4), (3)  π(S)  7950     3217     11166  no  yes 
strategy  0.6  1.65  0.6  0.6    
v(S)  4561  5547  994  963    
10  (1,3,4), (2)  π(S)  6518  5547        12065  no  yes 
strategy  1.05  0.6  0.6  0.6    
v(S)  7376  2651  1242  1065    
11  (2,3,4), (1)  π(S)  7376  4957  12333  no  yes 
strategy  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6    
v(S)  6083  3434  1745  1269    
12  (1,2,3,4)  π(S)  12530  12530  no  yes 
   14 
5 Optimal effort strategies 
The  present  section  presents  the  results  of  the  coalition  formation  game  when  each 
coalition adopts optimal fishing efforts for its members
6. Table 3 presents the partition 
function of the game. As expected, the coalition payoffs  ( ) S S p , shown in shaded, have 
increased relative to the previous scenario, whereas the outcome of the singleton coalition 
structure (1) remained unchanged. The results show that similarly to the restricted effort 
case the present game exhibits positive externalities. Further, when departing from full 
non-cooperation (1) to the grand-coalition (12) the aggregate payoff increases from 7.7 
million euros to 17.2 million euros. The same applies to all mergers and therefore the 
game is globally efficient. 
However, the game is not superadditive, that is, there are mergers that decrease the 
aggregate payoff of the players involved. There are three cases when superadditivity fails. 
For instance, under coalition structure 2, the payoff of the coalition formed by Finland and 
Sweden is lower than the sum of the payoffs that these countries would get if the coalition 
would break apart. As Eyckmans and Finus (2004) show, through a survey of coalition 
games, the violation of superadditivity is not unusual in games in partition function form. 
Moreover, in fishery games, the violation of superadditivity is also common, even using 
simple bioeconomic models (e.g. the classical Gordon-Schaefer model used in Pintassilgo 
et al. (2008), for some parameter values). One of the reasons why superadditivity fails, 
termed as the “leakage effect”, is that, in the presence of a merger, singletons tend to 
increase their fishing efforts as a reaction to the reduction of the total fishing effort of the 
players involved in the merger.  
Having analysed fundamental characteristics of the game, let us now study the stability 
of all possible coalitions. In this section we allow for transfers between coalition members. 
Thus,  let  us  introduce  the  concept  of  potential  internal  stable  coalition.  According  to 
Eyckmans and Finus (2004), a coalition S is potentially internally stable (PIS) for partition 
function p  if and only if:  ( ) { } ( ) \ , S i i S S S i p p
Î ³∑  i.e. the value of the coalition is at least 
equal to the sum of the free rider payoffs. The free-rider payoff is defined as the payoffs of 
a coalition member that leaves it to become a singleton, holding the rest of the coalition 
structure unchanged. Table 3 shows that the present game, in addition to the singleton 











                                                 
6 The results show the partition function of the "Cooperation B" scenario analyzed in Kulmala et al. 
(2009).   15 
Table 3  Partition  function in thousand's of euros (t€)  for the optimal strategies scenario. 
Coalition (S)     Finland  Sweden  Denmark  Poland 
         1  2  3  4  total  PIS 
strategy  0.9 1.05 0.45 1.35    
1  (1),(2),(3),(4)  π(S)  4101 1934 170 1451  7656  yes 
strategy  0.75 0.45 0.75 1.5    
2  (1,2), (3), (4)  π(S)  5421  506 1807  7734  no 
E[strategy]  0.90 1.13 0 1.43    
3  (1,3), (2), (4)  E[π(S)]  4328 2225 1591  8144  yes 
strategy  1.05 1.5 1.65 0    
4  (1,4), (2), (3)  π(S)  5922 4630 2419    12971  yes 
E[strategy]  0.90 1.13 0 1.43    
5  (2,3), (1), (4)  E[π(S)]  4328 2225 1591  8144  yes 
strategy  1.05 1.5 1.65 0    
6  (2,4), (1), (3)  π(S)  5922 4630 2419    12971  yes 
strategy  1.05 1.5 1.65 0    
7  (3,4), (1), (2)  π(S)  5922 4630 2419  12971  yes 
strategy  0.75 0.75 0 1.5    
8  (1,2,3) (4)  π(S)  6776  1963  8739  no 
strategy  0.75 1.05 2.25 0    
9  (1,2,4) (3)  π(S)  9927    4436    14363  no 
strategy  0.9 1.8 0.75 0    
10  (1,3,4) (2)  π(S)  8316 7109       15425  no 
E[strategy]  1.125 1.875 0 0    
11  (2,3,4) (1)  E[π(S)]  7988 7766   15754  no 
strategy  0.75 1.5 0 0    
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We now turn to the sharing of the gains from cooperation. We consider the Almost Ideal 
Sharing Scheme (AISS) suggested by Eyckmans and Finus (2004). They showed that the 
AISS stabilizes the PIS coalition that has the highest aggregate worth and therefore that 
sharing scheme can be regarded as optimal. Further, this result is robust with respect to the 
surplus allocation, i.e. it does not depend on the sharing weights. Eyckmans and Finus 
(2004) define the Almost Ideal Valuation Function (AIVF) for coalition game  ( ) , N p G  as 
a valuation function 
( ) AIVF v
l  that satisfies:  
 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( )








i S v S S i S S
S N





 " Î = +  " Í 
" Î =  
  
with  ( ) { }
1 | 1
s s
j j S S l l l
-
+ Î ÎD = Î = ∑ ℝ ,  where 
1 s- D denotes  the  set  of  all  possible 
sharing  weights  of  a  coalition  with  s  players,  and  ( ) S s   the  coalition  surplus, 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) \ S i
i S
S S S i s p p
Î
= -∑ , which can be positive, negative or nil. Consequently, an 
AIVF allocates to each coalition member its free-rider payoff plus some share,  ( ) S l , of 
the surplus. We illustrate the AISS by using equal weights i.e.  ( )
1
, , . i S S N i S
s
l = " Í " Î   
Table 4 presents the stability analysis of the present game. The results show that the 
AISS  stabilizes  all  the  PIS  coalitions.  Further,  the  three  coalition  structures  with  the 
highest aggregate payoff (4, 6 and 7) have Poland as a member. It can also be noted that 
no coalition where both Finland and Sweden are present is stable. Stable cooperation can 
only  be  achieved  through  two-player  coalitions.  However,  these  coalitions  lead  to 



















   17 
Table 4  Valuation functions for the optimal effort strategies with the Almost Ideal Sharing 
  Scheme (AISS). 
Coalition (S)     AISS  
        Finland  Sweden  Denmark  Poland 
total  IS  ES 
share           
1  (1),(2),(3),(4)  v(S)  4101  1934  170  1451  7656  yes  yes 
share  0.70  0.30       
2  (1,2), (3), (4)  v(S)  3794  1627  506  1807  7734  no  yes 
share  0.95    0.05     
3  (1,3), (2), (4)  v(S)  4129  2225  198  1591  8144  yes  yes 
share  0.72      0.28   
4  (1,4), (2), (3)  v(S)  4286  4630  2419  1636  12971  yes  yes 
share    0.90  0.10     
5  (2,3), (1), (4)  v(S)  4328  1994  231  1591  8144  yes  yes 
share    0.55    0.45   
6  (2,4), (1), (3)  v(S)  5922  2556  2419  2074  12971  yes  yes 
share      0.24  0.76   
7  (3,4), (1), (2)  v(S)  5922  4630  569  1850  12971  yes  yes 
share  0.62  0.31  0.06      
8  (1,2,3), (4)  v(S)  4234  2131  411  1963  8739  no  yes 
share  0.51  0.38     0.10   
9  (1,2,4), (3)  v(S)  5111  3819  4436  996  14363  no  yes 
share  0.65     0.23  0.13   
10  (1,3,4), (2)  v(S)  5384  7109  1880  1052  15425  no  yes 
share    0.56  0.27  0.17   
11  (2,3,4), (1)  v(S)  7988  4339  2127  1300  15754  no  yes 
share  0.40  0.35  0.20  0.05   
12  (1,2,3,4)  v(S)  6911  6032  3359  886  17187  no  yes 
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6 Implications for salmon stocks 
Given the differences in the fleet structure of each country and the migration route of 
salmon stocks, it is relevant to assess the status of the salmon stocks under the different 
coalition structures. We examine the following coalition structures: full non-cooperation 
(1), the stable coalition structures with two-player coalitions (3&5, and 4&6&7), and the 
grand-coalition under both the optimal effort strategies (12 opt.) and the restricted effort 
strategies (12 res.). Figure 3 illustrates the smolt production of six salmon rivers and the 
respective biological management objective, that is, to reach 50% of the smolt production 
capacity,  by  the  year  2010.  The  rivers  in  the  upper  part  of  the  figure,  Tornionjoki, 
Simojoki, and Råneälven, belong to the assessment unit 1, rivers Sävarån and Lögdeälven 
belong to the assessment unit 2, and river Emån to the assessment unit 4 (see Table 1). 
The results show that the stable cooperative coalition structures produce significantly 
lower number of smolts than the grand coalition, in both the restricted and optimal effort 
cases. Further the performance of stable coalitions, in terms of number of smolts, is closer 
to non-cooperation than to the grand coalition. Consequently, the biological management 
objectives cannot be reached with stable coalitions. However, in economic terms there are 
significant gains for departing from non-cooperation to a stable coalition (see Table 3).  19
 
Figure 3   The number of smolts per river under different coalition structures. The horizontal dotted line shows the 50% of the estimated mean carrying 
capacity (ICES 2008 p. 255).  20 
7 Conclusions 
The Atlantic salmon fishery in the Baltic Sea has shown clear signs of biological and 
economic  over-exploitation,  over  the  last  two  decades.  Although,  all  the  Baltic  Sea 
riparian countries, except Russia, are members of the European Union and agree on the 
annual fishing possibilities under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) the salmon quota 
has  not  restricted  the  fishery.  The  catches  year  after  year  below  TACs  suggest  that 
cooperation under the CFP framework has been trivial. 
Using  a  game  in  the  partition  function  form,  we  show  that,  in  fact,  cooperation 
between the countries that are responsible for nearly 90% of the salmon catch is not a 
stable outcome. On the contrary, the equilibrium of the game is full non-cooperation if the 
fishing strategies are in accordance with the Relative Stability Principle (RSP). Moreover, 
in this equilibrium the fishing strategies of the two major players, Finland and Sweden, are 
close to what has been effectively reported by them. Thus, the actual management of the 
salmon  stocks  in  the  Baltic  Sea  resembles  the  case  of  full  non-cooperation.  We  also 
investigated the consequences of relaxing the RSP by allowing each coalition member to 
adopt  its  optimal  strategy.  The  results  show  that  the  presence  of  positive  externalities 
makes cooperation elusive. However, an appropriate sharing rule, AISS, is able to stabilize 
two-player-coalitions. It is found that in all stable coalition structures, with the highest 
aggregate payoff, Poland is a coalition member. Further, we found that any cooperative 
agreement that includes Finland and Sweden, the two countries where the reproduction 
areas of this anadromous species are located, is not stable. 
The  results  show  that  substantial  economic  benefits  could  have  been  realised  by 
reallocating the fishing effort, but the biological management objectives could not have 
been reached with stable coalitions. The present analysis considered the period 1995-2005. 
Due to the life cycle of salmon, a longer period would be needed in  order  for stable 
coalitions to produce significant biological benefits.  
Some of results obtained are significantly different from those obtained by Pintassilgo 
and  Lindroos  (2008).  Using  the  classical  Gordon-Schaefer  bioeconomic  model  in  a 
symmetric player setting, the authors concluded that the only stable coalition structure is 
the  one  formed  by  singletons,  that  is,  complete  non-cooperation.  Hence,  our  results 
indicate  that  by  allowing  for  asymmetric  players  and  considering  disaggregated 
bioeconomic models it is possible to guarantee higher levels of cooperation. Extending the 
present empirical model opens several possibilities for further research, namely studying 
the stability of coalitions over time and the role of uncertainty in coalition formation. 
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